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Abstract
The  cases  of  corruption  reported  by  the  media  tend  almost  always  to  involve  a
private party (a citizen or a corporation) that pays, or promises to pay, money to a public
party (a politician or a public official, for example) in order to obtain an advantage or avoid a
disadvantage. Because of the harm it does to economic efficiency and growth, and because of
its social, political and ethical consequences, private-to-public corruption has been widely
studied. Private-to-private corruption, by contrast, has been relatively neglected and only
recently has started to receive the attention it deserves. The purpose of this paper is to offer
some  thoughts  on  the  nature  and  importance  of  private-to-private  corruption;  the  legal
treatment  it  receives  in  some  of  the  world’s  leading  countries;  and  the  measures  that
companies can take to combat it, with special consideration of its ethical aspects.  
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Introduction1
The  cases  of  corruption  reported  by  the  media  tend  almost  always  to  involve  a
private party (a citizen or a corporation) that pays, or promises to pay, money to a public
party (a politician or a public official, for example) in order to obtain an advantage or avoid a
disadvantage. Because of the harm it does to economic efficiency and growth, and because of
its social, political and ethical consequences, private-to-public corruption has been widely
studied. It is also subject to legal regulations designed to prevent and punish it in almost all
countries of the world.
In  contrast,  private-to-private  corruption  has  been  much  less  studied  and  only
recently  has  started  to  receive  special  attention.  This  relative  lack  of  interest  may  be
attributed to a number of factors:
a)  It seems reasonable to assume that the private sector will be much more efficient
at protecting its own interests, and so corruption of this kind will be much less
likely to occur in the private sector. For example, it is assumed that the owners
and senior managers of companies will take the necessary measures to prevent
employees from acting in ways that are likely to harm the organization.
b)  Likewise, it is felt that there must be fewer incentives for this type of behavior
in  the  private  sector,  at  least  in  economies  in  which  there  is  effective
competition and in which inefficient behavior is sooner or later penalized by
the market.
c)  There  are  those  who  think  that  the  economic,  social  and  ethical  impact  of
private-to-private corruption must necessarily be less than that of private-to-
public corruption involving politicians or public officials, because of the nature
of the implied incentives.
d)  We tend to have very little information about actual cases of private-to-private
corruption because, as we shall see later, corruption suits are rarely successful
and  the  organizations  concerned  usually  prefer  not  to  draw  attention  to
themselves (one doesn’t air one’s dirty linen in public). Instead, they do their
best  to  deal  with  such  cases  by  means  of  internal  disciplinary  action  and,
occasionally,  by  trying  to  reach  an  out-of-court  settlement  with  the  injured
1 This paper is part of a research project on corruption and corporate ethics currently being carried out by the
Chair of Economics and Ethics at IESE. I would like to thank the Fundación José y Ana Royo for financial
assistance.parties. For the same reason, aggregate data on the phenomenon of private-to-
private corruption (the forms it takes, how widespread it is, and its costs) are
also very thin on the ground.2
And yet there is good reason to suspect that private-to-private corruption is no less
important, no less widespread, no less harmful and no less worth combating than private-to-
public corruption. In fact, in recent years a number of international bodies and institutions
have launched initiatives to prevent and take action against private-to-private corruption.3
The purpose of this paper is to offer some thoughts on the nature and importance of
private-to-private corruption; the legal treatment it receives in some of the world’s leading
countries; and the measures that can be taken to combat it, with special reference to the
ethical aspects of corruption. We start with a brief description of a recent case, before moving
on to analyze what we mean by private-to-private corruption and the different forms it takes.
We then discuss its ethical and legal dimensions, and offer a set of practical recommendations
to help companies deal with it. We end with some conclusions.
The  subject  has  become  increasingly  important  in  recent  years  for  a  variety  of
reasons:
1)  The progress made in the fight against private-to-public corruption has shed
light on the importance of private-to-private corruption. This has been reflected
in the area of international relations, above all in the ratification of the OECD
Convention  and  the  modification  of  many  countries’  legislation  to  make
bribery of foreign politicians or public officials a punishable offence.
2)  The intensification of competition in many markets appears to have led to a
proliferation of corrupt practices to the detriment of economic efficiency and
justice in trading relations.
3)  This same phenomenon has made companies more aware of the ways in which
private-to-private bribery and corruption restrict competition.
2
2 There  would  seem  to  be  little  doubt  that  unethical,  or  at  least  ethically  questionable,  practices  such  as
accepting gifts are commonplace among purchasing managers (Forker y Janson 1990, Narayanam 1992,
Ramsey 1989, Sibley 1979). Wood (1995) conducted a survey among purchasing managers in an area of the
United Kingdom and came to the conclusion that the most widespread dubious practices were gifts (82%),
invitations to shows (27%), misuse of the bidder’s information (27%) and offers of trips and holidays (18%).
3 For example, the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Council of Europe 1999a)
included recommendations on active bribery (art.7) and passive bribery (art.8) in the private sector, trading in
influence  (art.12),  money  laundering  of  proceeds  from  corruption  offences  (art.13),  falsification  of
accounting  documents  or  records  to  make  it  possible  (art.14),  participatory  acts  (art.15),  and  corporate
liability (art.18). And in the Civil Law Convention on Corruption (Council of Europe 1999b) it included
measures for the incorporation into domestic legislation of compensation for damage suffered as a result of
corruption, without distinction between public- or private-sector corruption. The International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) has set up a subcommittee to investigate and formulate proposals on private-to-private
corruption,  reporting  to  the  Standing  Committee  on  Extortion  and  Bribery  (since  renamed  the  Anti-
Corruption Committee), and has added to its Rules of Conduct (International Chamber of Commerce 1999)
an explicit statement on private-to-private corruption. The OECD, through its Working Group on Bribery and
Corruption, is currently studying the possibility of including private-to-private corruption in the Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.  The  United
Nations (1999) Global Program against Corruption is sponsoring a study that includes corruption among
private corporations, mainly small and medium-sized firms. The Communication of 21 May 1997 (Com(97)
192) by the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Union’s policy to
combat corruption urged that measures be taken to unify EU strategy in the fight against corruption in the
private sector. And the Joint Action of 22 December 1998, adopted by the Council of the EU, focused on the
fight against both active and passive corruption in the private sector.4)  The removal of many of the former barriers to trade between countries has
created the need for a level playing field, in which there can be no room for
corrupt practices.
5)  The  privatization  of  many  publicly  owned  companies  has  shifted  onto  the
private sector problems that previously were seen as belonging exclusively to
the area of private-to-public corruption. In fact, the distinction between private-
to-public and private-to-private corruption is increasingly coming to be seen as
irrelevant.
6) Liberalization and deregulation in many countries –in the transition economies,
for example– have shown very clearly what conditions the institutional, legal
and moral fabric of a society must satisfy in order for the market economy and
liberal democracy to take root in it.
7)  Marketing practices have become more professional, highlighting the problems
deriving from certain corrupt practices.
8)  For long periods the moral awareness of society in general has been stultified,
allowing corrupt practices to flourish. Then, as the effects of these practices
have become known, society itself has started to demand stricter standards of
morality in business.
A practical example
Jack Grubman was a stock analyst at Citigroup. The only son of a modest Philadelphia
family, he had notched up several major achievements in his life, including university diplomas
in mathematics and statistics, a job at AT&T, and finally a star job as telecommunications
analyst  at  Salomon  Smith  Barney,  Citigroup’s  investment  banking  arm4,  with  an  estimated
yearly income of around 20 million dollars. And yet he was having difficulty getting his twin
daughters accepted in a top-flight nursery school in 92nd Street in New York.
The story was broken by the Wall Street Journal, based on documents relating to a
suit brought by New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer against Citigroup for alleged
conflicts of interest between its investment banking and corporate banking divisions. It was
claimed that Citigroup chief executive Sanford Weill had helped Grubman get his daughters
into the school by backing the application for admission with a donation to the school by the
bank of one million dollars. To return the favor, Grubman was said to have upgraded his
rating on AT&T stock from “hold” to “buy” in October 1999, one month before the initial
public  offering  of  AT&T  Wireless.  This  enabled  Citigroup  to  strengthen  its  hold  on  the
important  AT&T  account;  Sanford  Weill  could  be  sure  of  the  support  of  AT&T  chief
executive and Citigroup board member Michael Armstrong in his attempt to unseat John
Reed as co-chairman of the group; and Jack Grubman got his daughters admitted to the
school he wanted. A few weeks later, Grubman adjusted his AT&T rating back downward.5
3
4 Salomon Smith Barney was acquired by Citibank when Citibank, under the management of Sanford Weill,
bought Travelers Group, led by John Reed, to form Citigroup.  
5 On 15 August 2002 Jack Grubman reached an agreement with Salomon Smith Barney whereby he would
leave the company with a severance package worth an estimated 32 million dollars. For a very concise but
substantially complete account of the case, see Pérez-Campanero (2002).  The  case  is  one  of  a  long  list  of  scandals  that  have  swept  the  corporations  and
financial world of the United States in recent years. The judicial inquiries into Citigroup and
Grubman included various possible offences: 1) gifts of stock by Citigroup to the managers
of  companies  (WorldCom)  whose  IPOs  it  was  managing  (a  form  of  private-to-private
corruption);  2)  regular  attendance  by  Salomon  Smith  Barney  analysts  at  meetings  of  the
boards  of  directors  of  companies  that  were  planning  some  kind  of  merger  (conflict  of
interests);  3)  recommendations  to  buy  stock  in  companies  that  were  already  in  serious
financial trouble (Global Crossing, Winstar, WorldCom);6 4) recommendations to buy the
stock of companies such as AT&T and AT&T Wireless that while not in financial difficulties
did  not  objectively  warrant  any  such  recommendation,  without  disclosing  the  conflict  of
interests that existed between Citigroup and the AT&T group; 5) exertion of pressure on
analysts to upgrade their ratings of the stocks of companies in which the group had a special
interest.7 The Citigroup-Grubman case is of particular interest to us here because it is one of
the few cases of private-to-private corruption that have been aired in public in any detail.
Private-to-private corruption
Corruption is a varied and shifting phenomenon; it is difficult to define it in terms
that are clear and universally valid. Our focus in this paper is on private-to-private corruption.
This is the type of corruption that occurs when a manager or employee exercises a certain
power or influence over the performance of a function, task or responsibility within a private
organization or corporation.8 Because he has a margin of discretion,9 he can choose to act
contrary to the duties and responsibilities of his post or job, and thus in a way that directly or
indirectly harms the company or organization,10 for his own benefit or for that of another
person, company or organization.11
Private-to-private corruption may take a variety of specific forms: bribery (when it is
the person who pays who takes the initiative); extortion or solicitation (when it is the person
4
6 Jack Grubman did not change his recommendation on WorldCom from “hold” to “sell” until one week before
the company filed for what was to become the largest bankruptcy in United States history. 
7 At first the company denied these reports as “nonsense” and “pure fantasy”. Later, the group chief executive
admitted:  “I  did  suggest  to  Jack  Grubman  that  he  take  a  fresh  look  at  AT&T  in  light  of  the  dramatic
transformation  of  the  company  and  the  industry.”  But  he  denied  having  made  any  attempt  to  influence
Grubman’s valuation: “I always believed that Mr. Grubman would conduct his own research and reach
independent conclusions that were entirely his own,” he said (cfr. La Vanguardia Digital, 14 November
2002). 
8 This definition also applies to not-for-profit organizations, NGOs, associations, foundations, etc., and even to
publicly owned companies insofar as they operate on the same basis as private companies.
9 Owing to the limitations of the agency contract, which is the contract that is entered into when a principal
(the owner of a company, for example) gives to her agent (a manager) powers to govern all or part of the
principal’s organization in accordance with the principal’s instructions and serving the principal’s interests.
No agency contract can provide for every eventuality nor specify the response to be given in each case.
Hence, the agent may exercise her mandate for her own benefit or for the benefit of a third party, to the
detriment of the interests of the principal. On agency theory, see Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and
Meckling (1976).   
10 The harm is done, in every case, as a consequence of the breach of duty, even if the action does not directly
affect  the  company’s  income  statement  or  balance  sheet.  Such  would  be  the  case,  for  example,  if  a
purchasing manager demands a commission in return for placing an order with a particular supplier, without
this affecting either cost or quality for the purchasing company; or if a personnel manager accepts a gift in
return for taking on an employee who is perfectly qualified for the job for which she is hired, etc. Apart from
this, there may also be direct harm to the company’s interests, assets or profitability.
11 This description is adapted from Argandoña (2000); see also Argandoña (2001). Other, similar definitions
may be found in Ginwala (1998), Jain (1998), Johnston (1997), Tanzi (1995, 1998), etc.  who receives the payment who takes the initiative, whether explicitly or otherwise); dubious
commissions, gifts and favors; facilitation payments (to speed up completion of an order,
delivery of goods or payment of an invoice, for example); nepotism and favoritism (in the
hiring and promotion of personnel, for example); illegitimate use or trading of information
(trade or industrial secrets, for example); use of undue influence to change a valuation or
recommendation (as in the case described above); and an endless array of other possibilities
born of human ingenuity over the centuries.
A typical example of this type of behavior is that of a company manager or sales
representative  who  gives,  or  promises  to  give,  money,  presents  or  other  rewards  or
advantages  to  the  purchasing  manager  or  buyer  of  a  client  company  in  order  to  win  an
order.12 It may be the payer who makes the first move (bribery), or it may be the payee
(extortion or solicitation). The distinction is not always clear, however, as what at first sight
appears to be bribery may conceal an act of extortion (or vice versa, an act of bribery may be
justified alleging a prior attempt at extortion).
The payment may be made (allegedly) to benefit the company that secures the order;
to benefit the manager or employee who pays (by helping her to meet her sales targets and so
avoid a penalty or earn a bonus, for example); or to benefit both sides. The payment may be
made in various forms: in cash or in kind, such as a favor or service, or a promise to exert
influence on another person so that this other person will do a favor to the interested party or
to a third party, etc. In some cases an agent, broker or intermediary may be used to facilitate
the transaction.
The  thing  that  the  payment  is  supposed  to  obtain  for  the  payer  (an  order,  for
example) may be something to which the payer is entitled, at least in terms of objective
justice (e.g., because the terms offered are at least as good or better than those offered by
other competitors); or it may be something blatantly unfair (e.g., when the aim is to persuade
the payee to accept terms that are worse than those offered by other competitors in price,
quality, service, etc.); or the payment may even be a means of self-defense against unfair
treatment by the payee (e.g., because the payee threatens not to place any orders unless she is
paid a certain amount of money, or threatens to remove the paying company from the list of
potential suppliers, etc.).
Other situations that commonly arise in this type of private-to-private corruption are:
1)  Offers of gifts to the buyer or purchasing manager of a client company not in
order to obtain a special favor but to make the person receiving the gift more
inclined to grant such favors in the future, if necessary.13 This practice is not
always easy to distinguish from the legitimate custom of making (modest) gifts
in recognition of legitimate favors, “to oil the wheels of business relations”,
etc.14
5
12 This is a typical but fairly elementary example. In practice, corruption may take far more complex forms,
such as offering to include the seller in a shortlist of regular suppliers, or allowing it to have a say in defining
the terms of the contract to ensure that it has the best offer, etc. The manager or employee who makes the
payment may do so with or without her company’s or her boss’s knowledge and consent.
13 The gifts may include invitations to meals, sports events, cultural events, shows, parties, holidays and trips,
and also sexual favors.
14 Corruption tends not to occur in isolation; rather, it tends to be embedded in social customs or practices
involving widespread trading of favors, situations in which “everybody has to pay”, etc.2)  Payments  (or  other  types  of  rewards)  to  the  managers  or  employees  of  a
manufacturer,  importer,  wholesaler  or  distributor  in  order  to  obtain  a
distribution agreement, license or franchise.
3)  Payments to the managers of a financial institution in order to obtain a loan or
secure more favorable terms on a transaction (to guarantee the placement of an
issue of shares, for example).
4)  Payments  to  obtain  insider  information  on  a  company’s  transactions  that  is
likely to lead to a change in the price of the company’s shares (sale of insider
information).
5)  Payments to obtain technical or commercial information (designs, customer
lists, know-how, prices offered by other companies, terms offered by rivals in a
competitive  tender,  etc.).  Some  of  the  means  employed  in  these  practices
belong  to  the  sphere  of  private-to-private  corruption.  They  include:  hiring
managers  or  employees  of  other  companies  to  obtain  insider  information;
bribing managers or employees to obtain such information, etc.15
6)  Payments to the managers of retail distributors (supermarkets, hypermarkets,
superstores, etc.) to obtain privileged shelf space.
7)  Payments  to  a  company’s  personnel  director  to  ensure  that  a  particular
employee or manager is hired or promoted.
8)  Payments to independent professionals who have specific duties (accountants,
auditors, consultants, financial analysts, etc.) to induce them to act contrary to
those duties.16
9)  Payments to journalists to induce them to report company news in a favorable
light.
The ethical dimension of private-to-private corruption17
The core of the moral problem of private-to-private corruption lies in the fact that a
manager or employee of a company acts unjustly and disloyally in the performance of her
(explicit  or  implicit)  duty  toward  her  company,  taking  advantage  of  her  office  or
responsibility  to  obtain  a  benefit  for  herself  or  for  another  (a  relative  or  a  friend,  for
example).18
6
15 Cfr. Higginson (1995). 
16 In principle, situations in companies such as when a manager forces a subordinate to modify a report or
change an accounting record, without there being any payment by a third party, would not be included under
the  heading  of  private-to-private  corruption.  However,  certain  professions  (auditors,  accountants,
consultants, financial analysts, etc.) may be considered to have a special responsibility towards society,
above and beyond their duty towards the company. Therefore, in such cases these would also be examples of
private-to-private corruption. 
17 This section is based on Argandoña (2001). 
18 In any event, the person who acts corruptly harms herself beause she loses virtues and acquires vices, which
will make it more difficult for her to act honestly in the future. A manager or employee who acts corruptly may also do injustice:
a)  to the other party by causing or threatening to cause her unjust harm if she
refuses to pay, for example;
b)  to the company itself by not buying or selling on the best terms as regards
price, quality, service, etc., for example; by putting the company’s reputation at
risk; by encouraging others to act in the same way; by depriving the company
of  some  right  or  property,  etc.;  or  by  creating  conditions  that  will  allow
corruption  to  thrive  and  go  unnoticed,  such  as  a  lack  of  transparency,
concealment of information, falsification of company records, etc.;
c)  to third parties, such as competitors whose bid is not accepted, despite being
better than the company’s own bid;
d)  and to society in general, insofar as the action helps to build an atmosphere of
corruption, distrust, etc.
The  person  who  fosters  corruption  cooperates  as  instigator  or  accomplice  in  the
disloyal behavior of the person who acts corruptly, to her own benefit or to the benefit of
another person, or to avoid disadvantage. Depending on the circumstances, the corrupt action
may  give  rise  to  other  moral  problems,  by  leading  to  injustice  against  other  people  or
companies  (competitors,  for  example,  which  find  themselves  unfairly  treated),  or  by
encouraging complicity and setting bad examples, or by undermining basic concern for other
members of society, etc.19
When  analyzing  the  ethical  implications  of  a  situation  of  corruption,  the  rules
normally applied are as follows:
1)  A manager or employee may not solicit or demand an extortion, because it
would commit her to carry out an immoral act – besides forcing the other party
likewise to behave unethically, as her accomplice.20
2)  A manager or employee may not accept bribes, for the same reason.
3)  Nobody may offer bribes, as to do so is equivalent to instigating the other party
to commit an unethical (and illegal) act.
4)  A person may not give in to extortion to obtain something to which she is not
entitled.21
7
19 The person who fosters corruption will likewise experience the negative learning mentioned in the previous
footnote. 
20 Is it acceptable for a manager or employee to extort money from the other party if she intends at all times to
act  with  complete  loyalty  to  her  own  company?  Obviously  not,  because  she  would  be  acting  unjustly
towards the person who pays and because, in any case, she would be undermining the good name of the
organization she serves.
21 Whether or not it is easy to decide what a person is entitled to is another matter. For example, a company
does not have a right to a contract when a competitor has offered better terms in all respects; nor does it have
the right to have a tribunal rule in its favour when it is in the wrong. 5)  In  certain  circumstances,  a  person  may  give  in  to  extortion  (tolerate  an
injustice,  but  not  cause  one)  in  order  to  obtain  something  to  which  she  is
entitled.22 In such cases, the rules to be followed are:23
a)  carefully weigh up all the available options to see if the problem can be
solved  without  resorting  to  corruption  (or  causing  any  more  serious
problem);
b) the  extortion  must  be  explicit  or  at  least  sufficiently  obvious  –  in  other
words,  an  attempt  at  bribery  should  not  be  covered  up  as  if  it  were  a
response to extortion or solicitation;
c)  the person must act with the intention of exercising a right;
d) the person must do all she can to avoid causing unjust harm to others;
e)  there must be objective reasons of sufficient weight, in proportion to the
harm caused;
f)  every effort must be made to avoid scandal and the bad example that the
action may give rise to;24
g) steps must be taken to see to it that similar situations of collaboration with
corruption are not repeated in the future.25
In practice, each case needs to be considered individually in all its circumstances
and detail in order to fully assess the moral problem and propose solutions. Because, for one
thing, many cases are not at all straightforward.
For instance, a company may learn that one of its managers or employees is taking
money in one of the ways described earlier, and it may consent to this. Does that change the
morality of the payment? In my opinion it does not, because what defines corruption is not
the fact that it is hidden, nor even the fact that a payment is actually made, but rather the
failure by the corrupt manager or employee to perform her duty towards the company; that is,
the manager or employee’s disloyalty in making decisions for her own benefit, rather than for
the benefit of the company.26
But what if it is the company itself that demands the payment? In the world of
retailing, for example, a client company may demand a payment from the supplier before it
will even consider the company’s offer. I do not think that this is corruption, as there is no
question of the manager or employee failing in her duty of loyalty to the company – although
8
22 When a company has “no option” but to give in to extortion, it is usually because it has made some mistake
in the past – allowing itself to become over-dependent on a small number of customers, for example, or
failing to diversify its product portfolio, or going too far in its use of gifts and other dubious practices, etc.
Now it must pay the consequences. 
23 These rules are a practical application of other rules that go back a long way in the history of ethics but that
have received scant attention in recent years, perhaps owing to the influence of utilitarian and deontological
ethics. Cfr. Fernández (1994), Koslowski (1987), Melé (1994). 
24 Including the bad example given to the company’s own employees.
25 This is an important condition when it comes to judging the sincerity of those who say they “have no choice”
but to pay up when subjected to extortion. And as corruption is a social problem, it is also important that
measures be taken to curb it or prevent it from perpetuating itself.
26 In some countries the fact of the payment is sufficient on its own to constitute an offence.certainly there may be problems of unfairness in the treatment of different suppliers, or abuse
of a dominant position by the purchasing company, or the danger that a corrupt manager may
add to the payment demanded by her company an additional sum for her own pocket, in
which case there would clearly be corruption.
A more complicated case would be that of a manager or employee who receives a
payment in return for placing an order, but who tries invariably to act in accordance with her
duty, serving the company she works for as best she can. In this case there is no disloyalty, so
there is no corruption. However, accepting a payment entails at the very least a temptation to
allow one’s decision to be guided more by one’s own interest than by one’s duty to the
company. And the possibility of deceiving oneself about the relative merits of one offer
compared to another (cognitive dissonance) must always be taken into account.27 Also, when
such payments are accepted, an atmosphere of corruption starts to permeate the company, the
industry and society in general; the company’s reputation suffers; and the person who makes
the payment is encouraged to think that bribery is necessary in order to succeed in business.
Legal treatment of private-to-private corruption
The legal treatment of private-to-private corruption naturally does not coincide with
the moral point of view. And there are considerable differences from one country to another,
although almost all countries have some kind of law that more or less covers the problem we
are concerned with here.28
Private-to-private corruption is considered a criminal offence in the legislation of
different countries on the basis of various different principles, and often these principles
overlap in one and the same country:29
1)  On the basis of the manager or employee’s fiduciary duties and duty of loyalty
toward the company’s shareholders or owners (mainly in the case of senior
executives or board members)30 or toward the employees themselves (in the
case of managers and employees). Breach of trust is an offence in English and
Welsh and French law; integrity of labor relations is protected under Dutch,
South Korean and Swedish law; fiduciary relationships are regulated in the
United States; and integrity in business-related duties is guaranteed by law in
Japan.  In  some  circumstances  the  application  of  this  principle  means  that
corrupt  practices  are  legal  so  long  as  the  employer  knows  about  them  and
9
27 For this reason, when it is difficult to reject a bribe, the right thing to do is to inform company management,
pay over to the company the money or gifts received, and inform the person who paid of what has been
done. In the case of independent professionals –doctors, for example– who receive gifts or commissions in
return for their services –tests performed or treatment given to patients– it is common practice to make a
donation to a charity and send the receipt for this donation to the person who made the payment, assuming
the gift cannot be returned. 
28 In what follows I am indebted to the still unpublished preliminary conclusions of the study carried out at the
request of the International Chamber of Commerce by the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Criminal
Law in Freiburg, with funding from the Ford Foundation and covering 13 OECD countries: Germany, South
Korea, Spain, United States, France, Holland, England and Wales, Italy, Japan, Poland, Czech Republic,
Sweden and Switzerland. 
29 Cfr. International Chamber of Commerce (2002). 
30 The practical difficulty of founding the fight against corruption on fiduciary duties or duties of loyalty lies in
the fact that these duties are not specified in managers’ and employees’ employment contracts, and may vary
from one company, industry or country to another. approves  of  them,  even  if  only  tacitly.  It  can  also  mean  that  in  some
circumstances the company is not responsible for the behavior of its managers
or employees, although the reverse is more often the case.
2)  On the basis of consumer or user protection, or defense of competition or of the
market  economy  (principle  of  free  competition).  The  principle  of  free
competition  and  market  protection  is  enshrined  in  legislation  in  Germany,
Switzerland, the Czech Republic, and England and Wales.31 None of the parties
need necessarily have suffered any harm nor need any duty of loyalty have
been violated for the offence to have been committed and to be punishable.
3) On the basis of the need to safeguard a company’s assets and protect its owners
(anti-fraud  legislation).  This  makes  it  possible  to  take  legal  action  against
fraudulent  behavior,  as  in  Swiss  and  Spanish  legislation  –  including  when
managers or directors fail in their duty to manage or supervise the company in
accordance with the interests of its owners.
4)  On the basis of special legal provisions: against influence peddling, insider
trading, industrial espionage, abuse of office or position, etc. Legislation has
developed in a haphazard, piecemeal fashion in various countries, above all in
the United States.32
As a general rule, the fight against corruption may be fought:
1)  within  the  framework  of  criminal  law,  which  makes  corrupt  practices  a
criminal offence; or
2)  within the framework of civil law, which allows the victim to sue for damages; or
3)  within a framework of self-regulation, which leaves it to companies themselves
to solve the problem by establishing internal codes and rules and by setting up
inter-company or industry-wide agreements.
Many experts agree on the need to develop effective criminal legislation that makes
it possible to clearly identify corrupt behaviors and prosecute them.33 However, the results
achieved to date are very limited.34
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31 The notion of an offence against free competition is also envisaged in the Joint Action of the European
Union of 22 December 1998 on corruption in the private sector, provided that the conduct in question
involves a distortion of competition “as a minimum within the common market” (article 2, paragraph 2). 
32 The purchase of trade secrets, for example, is considered an offence in England and Wales, the Czech
Republic, France, Japan and Germany. 
33 The weaknesses of this approach are, mainly, the complex lawmaking that may be needed in order to cover
all possible cases; the danger that excessively detailed regulations will become an obstacle to the normal
conduct of business; the difficulty in keeping the legislation up-to-date; and the problem of coordinating
legislation in different countries with different legal systems, points of view and histories. 
34 The International Chamber of Commerce study mentioned earlier sheds some light on these results: very few
cases in France and Japan; 63 recorded cases in Germany (with no data as to their outcome); two sentences
on  64  cases  in  Holland;  0.05%  of  cases  brought  before  federal  courts  in  the  United  States  (including
situations of private-to-public corruption); and 200 “low-caliber” cases in Sweden. Only in South Korea,
where in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis the government took measures to clean up business practices,
does more forceful action appear to have been taken against private-to-private corruption, with 8,500 cases
investigated in 1998-1999, 40% of which led to the arrest of employees or managers. Cfr. International
Chamber of Commerce (2002). Most of the situations of corruption that come to light end in dismissal, often
without recourse to the courts or with an out-of-court settlement. Cfr. Heine (2001). Additional difficulties
arise  from  the  lack  of  clarity  in  legislation,  uncertainty  regarding  the  applicable  jurisdiction,  and  the
difficulty of obtaining evidence that is acceptable in court. Cfr. Rose (2001). Companies  tend  to  prefer  self-regulation  (mainly  to  avoid  the  judicialization  of
business  relations  and  the  high  costs  of  legal  actions),  backed  by  civil  laws  that,  where
necessary, provide for the payment of compensation for damages.35 However, the application
of civil law on damages is very limited. In most countries a company may sue an employee
who has breached her duty of loyalty to the company and caused it harm; but a competitor
which has suffered harm is unlikely to be able to sue, as it would have to sue for breach of
contract, which would mean having to demonstrate that there was a contract in force and that
the payment of a bribe by a third party caused a breach of that contract, all of which will be
extremely difficult to prove.36
Self-regulation  has  shown  itself  to  be  an  important  means  of  ensuring  that
companies and business associations take the fight against corruption seriously (both private-
to-public and private-to-private) and take specific measures to prohibit, detect and prosecute
it. Self-regulation needs to be complemented by an effective system of independent (internal
and external) audits, personnel training programs, and measures to protect whistleblowers. In
any event, it seems important to continue to develop legal and judicial measures to fully
define private-to-private corruption, extend the prohibition to its many variant forms, and
take steps to combat it effectively.
Fighting private-to-private corruption37
Fighting corruption is not an easy task. The fact that a company has an explicit
policy  (set  out  in  a  code  of  ethics  or  exemplified  in  the  determined  attitude  of  top
management) against bribery and extortion and other similar practices is no guarantee that
the  company’s  employees  will  always  behave  as  expected,  whether  out  of  ignorance  or
because their personal interests lie elsewhere, or because the actual culture of the company is
at odds with its declared aims. The following are some suggestions for companies that wish
to protect themselves against corruption, distinguishing between prophylactic or preventive
measures and curative or corrective measures.38
1. Preventive measures
1. Declaration of intent
The company’s top management must state very clearly its determination to fully
comply with all legislation, strictly prohibiting all forms of corruption, active or passive, in
the company, regardless of who pays, who gets paid, how much, etc. This statement may be
published in a code of conduct, a company credo, etc., or in open letters to employees, public
speeches, company newsletters, etc. And it should be reiterated at regular intervals.
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35 Cfr. International Chamber of Commerce (2002). 
36 In International Chamber of Commerce (2002) the following explanations are suggested for the fact that
procedures for claiming damages in cases of private-to-private corruption are rarely used: 1) the difficulties
of the procedure for making such claims; 2) the difficulty of proving the corrupt act, the harm sustained, and
the causal relationship between the two; 3) the frequent separation between criminal and civil legal action
(which means the two paths have to be pursued independently and often one after the other); 4) the high
costs of a long legal dispute; and 5) the reluctance of the victims to report the facts, on account of the
negative publicity it may entail.
37 This section is a summary of Argandoña (1999). 
38 Vincke et al. (1999) is an example of a similar attempt, based on the rules of the International Chamber of
Commerce mentioned earlier. This  type  of  public  statement  is  unlikely  to  have  any  effect,  and  may  even  be
counterproductive, unless top management backs up its words with deeds. Accordingly, it is
vital that management be seen, in all its decisions, to act strictly in accordance with its stated
aims. This is particularly important when it comes, for example, to awarding promotions,
prizes, distinctions, etc. to employees and managers, or setting up plans and programs, etc.,
taking care to avoid the even slightest suspicion of double standards.39
The company’s determination not to give in to corruption but to actively fight it
must be incorporated in the strategy preparation process. Top management must see to it that
this attitude becomes a part of the company’s culture and policies. The company’s statements
must be realistic in order to be credible.
2. Clearly defined responsibilities
It should be very clear at all times who is in control and who bears responsibility in
areas of activity where there is any possibility of corruption: contracts, authorizations, etc. In
some cases it may be worth pushing ultimate responsibility up to the very highest levels in
the organization.
3. Provision of general decision-making criteria
Top management must be in a position to provide technical, economic, legal and
ethical criteria for dealing with any problems that may arise in relation to corruption. Often,
these criteria will be of a general ethical nature, but on other occasions the company will
need to state openly the reasons why it rejects corruption.40 This may be done in a code of
conduct, for example, or in discussion sessions on ethical issues held in the context of a
personnel training program, etc.
The criteria will make it clear, for example, that suppliers, customers, consultants,
lawyers, etc. must be selected on the basis of their quality, cost, reputation, service to the
company, etc.
The criteria must also be known to customers, suppliers, etc., who have a right to
know who they are negotiating with, who makes the decisions that affect them directly, who
these people report to (i.e. who they can appeal or complain to), etc.
4. Consideration of specific situations
The issue of corruption and how to prevent it is often best tackled on the level of
concrete detail, so as to establish clear guidelines (bright lines). For example:
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39 Naturally, having an ethical code or similar instrument may be useful in the fight against corruption, but it
should not be seen as a panacea: the key lies in how it is applied in practice, and in generating the right sort
of culture. 
40 Including the right of employees not to be obliged or induced to engage in corrupt practices, not to be treated
as morally dubious people, and not to be identified with a company that allows unethical conduct. It also
includes  the  responsibility  the  company  may  incur  as  a  result  of  the  behaviour  of  its  managers  and
employees, acting as the company’s representatives, or exercising authority for decision making or for the
exercise  of  control  within  the  company,  etc.,  without  excluding  the  responsibilities  the  company  may
demand from the corrupt employee or manager.1)  Donations to charitable or cultural institutions should always be an expression
of civic duty and should never be made in the hope of receiving favors in
return. They must always be recorded in the company’s accounts, indicating
exactly how they were made (bank transfer, check, etc.) and, if necessary, the
name  of  the  person  who  took  receipt  of  the  donation  or  who  acted  as
intermediary.
2)  The company should explicitly prohibit the offering of gifts, payments, tips,
services, commissions, etc. beyond a certain amount that could be interpreted
as  violating,  or  attempting  to  violate,  the  honesty  and  independence  of
judgment of the person or persons who receive them, or that could jeopardize
the company’s good name.
3)  Accepting such gifts, tips, commissions etc., from any source whatever, should
likewise be explicitly prohibited.
4)  If company personnel must accept such gifts, a procedure for what to do with
them should be established: for example, the employee may be required always
to issue a receipt for the gift in the company’s name and to hand the gift over to
a  designated  company  officer,  who  will  do  with  it  as  the  company  deems
appropriate (hold a lottery among the employees, give it to charity, etc.).
5)  It is acceptable for managers or employees to pay or receive such commissions
as are legal and customary for their services as intermediaries, provided that
the  company  has  authorized  the  commissions  and  they  cannot  harm  the
company.
6)  If necessary, small gifts may be accepted, out of courtesy and to facilitate the
normal conduct of business relations, provided they do not exceed a certain
maximum value, are in conformity with the law, do not impose an obligation
on the person who accepts them, and cannot put the company in an awkward
position. They may include occasional meals, drinks, invitations to musical,
sporting or theatrical events, small incentives (trips, hotels, etc.), small birthday
or celebratory gifts, inexpensive promotional gifts, awards in recognition of
services  of  a  caring,  civic,  charitable  or  educational  nature,  payment  of  a
customer’s expenses (invitations), and so on. It is a good idea to give some
examples of exactly what managers and employees may and may not accept,
and of what they may and may not offer. It is also advisable to provide a
channel for clearing up any doubts or uncertainties.
7)  Facilitating payments (such as tips to speed up an order or payment) should be
prohibited.
8)  Limits  should  be  set  to  managers’  and  employees’  freedom  to  carry  on  a
business  outside  the  company  that  may  come  into  competition  with  the
company; hiring and doing business with relatives, etc. should be restricted;
procedures should be established for such cases (always notify the company,
always obtain authorization, etc.).
9)  Anonymity should be restricted: managers and employees should always give
their names to the people they deal with on the company’s behalf, even if they
do so by electronic means.
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kinds,  including  customer  entertainment,  travel  expenses,  etc.  Naturally,  all
claims must be backed by the necessary documents (receipts, bills, etc.).
11)  The  contracts  the  company  signs  with  managers  and  employees  who  have
access to privileged information (on customers, research, new products and
processes, etc.) should include clauses to prevent the use of this information for
the benefit of competitors for a prudent period of time after the employee has
left the company.
Often, to deal with these kinds of problems it is not enough merely to know the
appropriate criterion; the company must also offer solutions, alternatives and ways to safely
escape from existing situations. It is as well if the company’s employees and managers are
actually involved in compiling examples, criteria, etc.41
5. Reporting mechanisms
The  company  personnel  must  always  know  who  they  can  turn  to  report  corrupt
behavior within the company, or attempts at corruption by people outside the company (a
demand for an illicit payment, for example), or to obtain advice on specific conduct. This
higher authority may be each person’s superior, but in some circumstances it may be better to
have an even higher instance (an ethics counselor, a “red line”, an ombudsman, etc.), whom
people can consult either themselves or through another person, or even anonymously.42
Whenever  this  higher  instance  is  called  upon  for  advice  or  is  informed  of
misconduct, it is vital that it act quickly and discreetly, respecting the rights of the person
who asked for advice or reported the misconduct as well as the rights of those involved.
Needless to say, whistleblowers must always be protected.
The company must always allow for the possibility of reports coming from outside,
from the managers or employees of other organizations, for example, accusing the company’s
own managers and employees of corrupt behavior.
6. Transparency
All of the company’s transactions that involve receipts or payments of money must
be  faithfully,  accurately  and  promptly  recorded  in  the  company’s  accounts  or  in  the
appropriate books. False, misleading or incomplete entries must be strictly prohibited, and
the people whose job it is to record such transactions must be required always to adhere
scrupulously  to  official  accounting  standards  (those  established  by  law  and  those  of  the
professional associations of accountants and auditors). The confidentiality of these records
must be respected at all times.
Rules  should  be  established  for  accounting  for  dubious  payments  (notify  the
superior  of  the  person  concerned  or  the  person  responsible  for  the  ethics  hotline,  for
example).
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41 On the role of sales agents and representatives, cfr. Davies (1999). 
42 It is highly advisable that the ethical instances belong to line management and not to staff, and that they have
access to the uppermost levels of the company. The documents relating to these kinds of transactions must be kept for the stipulated
period of time, particularly those relating to the kind of transactions that are most likely to
give rise to accusations of corruption or legal disputes.
It is a good idea to keep a (confidential) file on the individuals with whom the
company has dealings of particular significance (such as the purchasing managers of client
companies), so that if ever the need arises the company has a record of who dealt with whom
on a particular matter, who placed a particular order, etc.
7. Restitution
It should be clearly established that the company will always return illicit payments
and  compensate  those  who  have  suffered  as  a  consequence  of  corrupt  behavior  by  its
managers or employees.
8. Supervision and control
The company must allocate sufficient resources (material and human) to monitoring
the company’s activities for evidence of corruption. Furthermore, if ever there is a suspicion
that corruption may have occurred (actively or passively) within the company, the evidence
must be investigated. Particular attention should be given to the offices or divisions in which
problems of corruption are most likely to occur: purchasing, sales, contracts, procurement,
etc.
Procedures  for  auditing  and  supervising  (internally  or  externally)  the  company’s
accounts and, if necessary, any transactions liable to give rise to corrupt behavior must be put
in place and adhered to, specifying in each case the person to whom the auditor must report.
If the company keeps accounts, it is precisely so that they may be examined and used by
management; therefore, those accounts must also be read and interpreted from the moral
point of view.
Company personnel must be given precise instructions to collaborate with (internal
or external) auditors and inspectors.
9. Training
Although  company  personnel  are  quite  likely  to  have  already  a  sound  ethical
training, this cannot be taken for granted. Nor can it be assumed that they will be capable of
correctly  identifying  the  situations  of  corruption  they  encounter  or  of  acting  always  in
accordance with established moral principles. Therefore, it may be advisable for the company
to assist its employees in this area:
1)  By  offering  them  the  necessary  moral  and  legal  training  to  enable  them  to
understand what corruption consists of, why it should be rejected, and what
consequences it may have. This may be done through courses, seminars, etc.,
or in the context of sessions held to draft or revise the ethical code.
2)  There is no substitute for selecting and hiring ethically aware managers and
employees. Particular care must be taken in judging the ethical caliber of the
15people  who  are  to  head  the  offices  or  departments  in  which  problems  of
corruption most commonly appear.
3)  It  is  a  good  idea  to  have  personnel  take  part  in  some  way  in  creating  the
company’s ethical code or ethical rules, teaching materials on business ethics,
etc. That way the company will have the benefit of their experience and they
will reinforce their ethical learning.
10. In search of excellence
Companies cannot be content merely to avoid becoming a target for other people’s
corruption,  or  becoming  guilty  of  corruption  themselves  through  their  managers  or
employees. Rather, they must actively strive always to remain strictly within the limits of the
law and of morality. What’s more, they should proactively seek to put an end to corruption,
starting with their own industry and their own home town, region or country. To do this the
company must adopt an attitude of permanent rejection of corruption, wherever it comes
from and whatever its causes and effects, even if it appears to benefit the company.
The  company  should  also  work  together  with  other  companies,  governments,
employers’ associations, NGOs, etc. in the fight against corruption, be it private or public, by
volunteering information (with due respect for people’s good name and privacy), offering
help,  not  leaving  those  who  have  espoused  this  cause  to  fight  the  battle  alone,  getting
employers’ and business associations involved, etc.43 It must also lend its backing to the
professional codes and rules of accountants, auditors, consultants, legal advisers, etc., insofar
as they contribute to the fight against corruption.
2. Corrective measures
When a conflict situation arises because the company is an active or passive party to
corruption, the mechanisms mentioned earlier should be brought into play, above all those
designed to identify and punish the culprits and, if necessary, revise the plan currently in
place. The company must establish clear and just procedures for assigning responsibility for
corrupt behavior. Any sanctions imposed must be proportionate, known and clear.
Besides dealing with the crisis, the company must make it an opportunity to take its
commitment  to  the  fight  against  corruption  one  step  further  –  by  formulating  an  anti-
corruption  strategy,  for  example,  announcing  it  publicly  and  putting  it  into  effect;  or  by
scrupulously reviewing all earlier situations in which corrupt behavior may have occurred; or
by redoubling its efforts to inform and train its employees (as well as its customers and
suppliers), etc. In a word, the company must seize the opportunity to give fresh impetus to
the fight against corruption, turning what at first sight may appear to be an embarrassment, or
even a serious problem, into a competitive advantage.
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43 The companies in the oil industry in Norway, for example, have developed a joint initiative to diffuse
information that may serve these ends. In other countries agreements have been reached to create “islands of
integrity” as promoted by Transparency International.Conclusions
Private-to-private corruption is a serious problem, no less serious than private-to-
public corruption. It deserves to be taken seriously by companies because it has a high cost –
not only financial (economic costs, inefficiency, fines, etc.), but also legal (accusations, suits
and penalties), social (loss of reputation, creation of an atmosphere favoring corruption, etc.),
and ethical (deterioration of the quality of the organization’s people and of its rules and
culture).  The  fact  that  our  empirical  knowledge  of  the  extent,  seriousness  and  costs  of
private-to-private  corruption  is  limited  should  not  fool  us  into  thinking  that  it  is  not
important.  This  concern  is  shared  by  several  international  bodies,  which  have  included
private-sector corruption in their efforts to improve the moral quality of business.
The battle against private-to-private corruption must be fought mainly on two fronts.
First, that of criminal and civil law, with the aim of defining the phenomenon more precisely,
offering a wider range of approaches for dealing with it, and making it possible for problems
to  be  dealt  with  as  they  arise.  Second,  that  of  voluntary  action  in  companies,  so  that
companies are adequately protected against active and passive corruption, through internal
organizational measures, industry self-regulation, inter-company agreements and the creation
of  an  ethical  atmosphere  within  and  around  organizations  that  makes  it  easier  for  those
concerned to identify situations of corruption, affords them the means to deal with such
situations,  and  above  all  gives  them  the  necessary  strength  (through  the  development  of
virtues) to do so.
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